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Picture yourself giving a speech to an
audience of one hundred people. While you
speak, every person boos and makes hostile
comments. You have no support. Would you
have the strength to persevere against such
adversity?
On January 16th, 2004, Pakistani
President Pervez Musharraf demonstrated
such strength. For about forty minutes, he was
booed and heckled while he tried to update
the Parliament on the status of Pakistan’s antiterrorism movement. His critics primarily
booed him for supporting the United States’
War on Terror. This incident demonstrates
that people all over the world have either
extremely negative views or extremely
positive views of the United States (Bidwai,
2003; Rohde, 2002; Ross, 2003). Some
people do not simply disagree with the United
States rather they despise to an extreme level
those people who agree with the United States
(Linville & Edward, 1980; Meindl & Lerner,
1984). Two assassination attempts on
President Musharraf presumably demonstrate
that people despised him because of his
positive feelings toward the United States.
Why and how do people become so
extreme that they would kill a person who
disagrees with them? One explanation for this
extremism is the effect of thought on a
person’s attitudes. If people believe Arabs
have less right to the Holy Land than do
Israelis, then these people might have a
moderately negative view of Arabs.
Examining the actions of others (e.g., Arabs)

and thinking about a situation (e.g., suicide
bombings) can cause people with initially
moderate negative views to hold extreme
negative views (i.e., polarize; Tesser, 1978).
Merely by thinking, people’s views about
Arab attacks on Jews may become more
extreme because the attacks (i.e., negative
behaviors) reinforce people’s initially
negative views. The amount of negative
examples people have to consider influences
the justification these people have for their
negative attitudes. Consequently, in many
instances after thinking, extremists feel
rightly justified in their attitudes and beliefs.
Psychologist Abraham Tesser (1978)
termed the aforementioned phenomenon as
self-generated attitude change. People’s
attitudes polarize when given time to think
(see Tesser, 1978, for a review). That is, if
people’s original attitudes are positive, then
after thinking about the object of their
attitudes, people’s attitudes will become more
positive. If people’s original attitudes are
negative, then after thinking about the object
of their attitudes, people’s attitudes will
become more negative. The longer people
think about an issue, the more extreme their
attitudes may become (Tesser & Conlee,
1975).
Thought, Beliefs, and Feelings
Thought is a fluid process that helps
people change the way they mentally see a
person, object, event, or issue (Tesser, 1978).
When people think, they change in a distinct
way what they believe. During thought,
people reconstruct their beliefs about a
person, object, event, or issue to make beliefs
consistent about that same person, object,
event, or issue (Tesser, 1978; Tesser &
Cowan, 1977). During reconstruction, when
people think about the object of their attitude
(e.g., person, event, or issue) people create
new beliefs, reinterpret vague information,
and reject questionable information. Thus,
through the reconstruction process, people
tend to make their beliefs consistent with
other beliefs (Tesser, 1978; Tesser, Martin,
& Mendolia, 1995). Individuals, for example,
may have moderately negative beliefs about

Palestinians. Thinking about negative
behaviors attributed to Palestinians (e.g.,
suicide bombings) may lead these individuals
to hold views that become more extreme
about all Arabs rather than just Palestinians.
What people think tends to influence
not only what they believe but also what they
feel (McGuire, 1969). That is, what people
feel about a person, object, event, or issue
depends in part on what they believe about
that same person, object, event, or issue. If,
for example, people do not agree with violent
attacks on the Holy Land and they generally
attribute those attacks to Arabs (i.e., belief),
then they will come to dislike Arabs (i.e.,
affect).
In sum, through thinking, people make
their subsequent beliefs consistent with their
original beliefs. People’s beliefs influence
their feelings. Consequently, people’s
thoughts make their beliefs more consistent
(i.e., less ambivalent), which in turn results in
their feelings being more consistent (i.e., less
conflicting). Basically, people’s thoughts lead
to their attitudes polarizing.

Table 1
Example of a possible schema about an Arab
person
Stimulus
Arab person

Schema
dark skinned
dark hair
speaks with an accent
robes
kaffiyeh (Arab headdress)
business owner
Ali Baba
criminal
bombings in Israel
Muslim

Schemas
People use their schemas or “naïve
[theories] of some stimulus domain” to think
about a person, object, event, or issue (see
Table 1 for an example; Tesser, 1978, p. 290).
As people use schemas, people’s beliefs
become consistent within their schemas.
When people use schemas during thought,
people find it easier than when not using
schemas during thought to focus on relevant
stimuli, recall relevant information, infer
absent information, interpret relevant
information and discount questionable
information (Tesser, 1978).

September 11th
terrorism
unfriendly people
don’t like those that are
different

Relevant stimuli. People use schemas
to provide a direction of focus for thinking
about relevant stimuli (Tesser, 1978).
Specifically, when people use well-developed
schemas, people focus their senses (e.g.,
vision, hearing, etc.) on relevant stimuli
(Tesser, 1978). Tesser and Danheiser (1978)
found that when participants were informed
they would be cooperating with their partner,
participants’ schemas of a cooperative
relationship helped them focus on positive
attributes about their partner. When

participants were informed they would be
competing with their partner, participants’
schemas of a competitive relationship helped
them focus on negative attributes about their
partner.
People tend to notice physical
attributes associated with their welldeveloped schema about a person, object,
event, or issue. If, for example, people have a
well-developed schema for suicide bombers
in Israel, certain physical characteristics
would get their attention. People might notice
skin color, hair texture, the sound of a
person’s voice, the language a person speaks,
or the clothing a person wears.
Recall relevant information. People’s
schemas help them recall relevant information
about a person, object, event, or issue (Tesser,
1978). When people try to recall relevant
information, people’s schemas provide rules
for how to think about a person, object, event,
or issue. That is, people tend to recall
behavior and information consistent with their
schema rather than behavior and information
inconsistent with their schema (Tesser, 1978).
When provided with a description of a
particular person, such as a job applicant for a
salesman position, participants recall
information they know about salesmen
(Clary, Tesser, & Downing, 1978).
Participants rated applicants that fit into their
schema of a salesman higher than those
applicants that did not fit into their schema of
a salesman. Following the previous example
(i.e., suicide bomber), if people focus on
physical characteristics relevant to a certain
schema, people will recall information (e.g.,
Muslim) they have about those who commit
suicide bombings.
Infer Absent information. People with
well-developed schemas about a person,
object, event, or issue are better able than
people with less-developed schemas to
generate beliefs consistent with their schema
(Leone & Ensley, 1985; Tesser & Leone,
1977). Therefore, when there are holes (i.e.,
deficits) in people’s information, people use
schemas to help them fill in any missing
information in their beliefs (Tesser, 1978).
People, for example, might hear on a news

broadcast that a person committed a terrorist
act. However, a newscaster may not provide
the terrorist’s nationality. People who have a
well-developed schema about Arabs being
terrorists would assume that the terrorist in
the news broadcast is an Arab.
People can also infer absent
information through employing substitution.
Rumelhart and Ortony (1976) found that
schemas could include both lower and higher
levels where lower levels have more details
than do higher levels. Substitute information
can come from a lower level within an
accessed higher level schema. However,
people can also use an activated higher level
schema to respond without giving all lower
level details. If, for example, people infer that
a person is an Arab, they do not need to know
how they made such an inference. All people
need to know is their conclusion: that person
is an Arab.
Interpret information. During the
interpretation process, people give meaning to
events. That is, people decide what
information means to them and how it relates
to their schema. If the information is
inconsistent with an established schema,
people often reinterpret the information
making it consistent with an established
schema (Tesser & Cowan, 1977). When asked
to evaluate ambiguous adjectives among sets
of unambiguous adjectives for the likeability
or dislikeability of an individual, participants
reinterpreted ambiguous adjectives to make
them consistent with unambiguous adjectives
(Tesser & Cowan, 1977). If all unambiguous
adjectives characterized a likeable person,
participants reinterpreted ambiguous
adjectives to make them consistent with the
likeable adjectives. If all unambiguous
adjectives represent a dislikeable person,
participants reinterpreted ambiguous
adjectives to make them consistent with the
dislikeable adjectives. When thinking about a
person who is an Arab, people will attribute to
that person behaviors and attitudes they
believe Arabs exhibit. If people believe Arabs
are unfriendly people, yet they see an Arab
being friendly to another person, people
would reinterpret the positive behavior to be

consistent with their unfriendly Arab schema.
Therefore, people might conclude that the
witnessed positive behavior was only an
attempt to appear to be a good person.
Discount questionable information.
People use schemas while performing several
cognitive processes such as understanding,
remembering, and thinking (Tesser, 1978).
During these cognitive processes, people tend
to discount questionable information (Lord,
Ross, & Lepper, 1979). When participants
interviewed other people to determine if
interviewees were introverted (i.e., shy) or
extroverted (i.e., outgoing), participants
tended to ask questions leading in the
direction of their hypothesis about the person
being an introvert or extrovert (Fazio, Effrein,
& Falender, 1981; Snyder & Swann, 1978). In
addition, participants asked questions about
their introverted behavior tended to behave in
a more introverted manner after being
interviewed than they did before being
interviewed. Participants asked questions
about their extroverted behavior tended to
behave in a more extroverted manner after
being interviewed than they did before being
interviewed (Fazio et al., 1981). Asking
leading questions forced interviewees to
remember and think about times they behaved
in an introverted or extroverted manner and
thus exhibit such behavior.
When people use a developed schema,
the more they think about some object or
event, the more people polarize their feelings.
Sadler and Tesser (1973) tested this notion by
having participants describe themselves to
one another. They found that when partners (a
recording made by the researcher)
complimented participants, participants given
an opportunity for thought evaluated their
partners more positively as compared to
participants who were distracted. In numerous
experiments (e.g., Leone, 1989, 1994; Leone
& Ensley, 1985), researchers found that
attitudes of participants given time to think
about a person, object, event, or issue, became
more polarized and more consistent with
existing schemas than attitudes of participants
not given time to think.

Moderating Influences
In order for attitudes to polarize,
people must think (i.e., engage their schema)
(Tesser, 1978). Not all forms of thought,
however, are the same (Spiro, 1975). People
who engage in a form of thought may or may
not experience attitude polarization. In
general, beliefs tend to be evaluatively
consistent within an existing schema (Tesser,
1978). However, process and reality
constraints can limit or reverse attitude
polarization (Tesser, 1976; 1978; Tesser et al.,
1995). People utilize process constraints when
examining the origin of a belief for unrealistic
or faulty support (e.g., Leone & Aronow,
1992; Tesser, Leone, & Clary, 1978). This
identification of the root of a belief is a
process constraint.
Through close examination of their
beliefs, people could determine that the root
of their beliefs is faulty or unrealistic because
the root does not stand up to scrutiny. People
could also realize that they made a leap of
logic and therefore have no logical basis for
their beliefs (Leone & Aronow, 1992; Tesser
et al., 1978). If people determine a belief is
unrealistic or faulty and cannot be supported,
people have no choice but to dismiss or reexamine their beliefs. Thus, because people
would no longer have a valid belief on which
to base their attitudes, peoples’ attitudes could
not polarize (see also Leone & Baldwin,
1983; Leone, Minor, & Baltimore, 1986).
Individuals believing Arabs are bad, for
example, can be asked to examine why they
hold such a belief. During examination,
individuals may review reasons for their
beliefs. However, individuals may have only
one reason: attacks on the Holy Land. Upon
further examination, those individuals
examining their beliefs may realize that
Israelis also commit attacks on the Holy
Land. Individuals realize that if they believe
Arabs are bad, they must also believe Israelis
are bad.
When people utilize reality
constraints, they focus on factual information
or verifiable attributes of a person, object,
event, or issue (Tesser, 1978; Tesser et al.,
1995). People test their beliefs against an

actual person, object, event, or issue to ensure
that what they believe is accurate or factual
(Festinger, 1954). When people become
aware of inconsistencies between their beliefs
about a person, object, event, or issue and
reality (i.e., factual information or a verifiable
attribute), these people will have no choice
but to abandon such beliefs in order to appear
reasonable and rational (Leone, Taylor, &
Adams, 1991). As people abandon beliefs
used to support polarized attitudes, people’s
polarized attitudes will weaken or depolarize
(see also Leone & Baldwin, 1983; Leone et
al., 1986).
Following a previous example,
individuals believing Arabs are bad may
witness an Arab exhibiting a positive
behavior such as assisting an elderly woman
crossing a street. The witnessed positive
behavior may be a reality constraint on the
extreme beliefs of individuals believing Arabs
are bad. Individuals’ reality constraints, in
this case helping an elderly person, will force
these individuals to acknowledge that their
extreme beliefs (e.g., Arabs are bad) are
inconsistent with reality. Through addressing
such inconsistencies between reality and their
beliefs, individuals will be forced to abandon
their extreme views about the Arab they
witnessed exhibiting a positive behavior and
possibly abandon their extreme views about
all Arabs.
Individual Differences
Individual differences in thinking style
are related to whether or not people’s thinking
leads to their attitudes polarizing. Individuals
with a verbal cognitive style (i.e., they think
and learn using words) will react to process
constraints and re-adjust their beliefs because
finding the origin of a belief requires thought
through words (Leone & Aronow, 1992).
Individuals with a visual cognitive style (i.e.,
they think and learn using pictures) will be
less likely to react to process constraints and
therefore be less likely to re-adjust their
beliefs because finding the origin of a belief
requires thought through words (Leone &
Aronow, 1992). When given process
constraints, individuals with a visual

cognitive style will be more likely than
individuals with a verbal cognitive style to
polarize their attitudes, because visual
individuals are less able to think in the verbal
style required to reanalyze and reconsider
beliefs.
The extent to which an individual is
dogmatic also influences attitude polarization.
Dogmatism refers to the way people think
about their world (Rokeach, 1954, 1960).
People who are dogmatic compartmentalize
beliefs and feelings about a person, object,
event, or issue (Franklin & Carr, 1971;
Zagona & Zurcher, 1965). Dogmatic people
could have many different beliefs about a
person, object, event, or issue but would
never integrate inconsistent information (Hunt
& Miller, 1968; Donehew, Parker &
McDermott, 1972). People who are nondogmatic integrate their beliefs and feelings
about a person, object, event, or issue
(Franklin & Carr, 1971; Zagona & Zurcher,
1965). Non-dogmatic people could have
many different beliefs about a person, object,
even, or issue and would integrate
inconsistent information (Hunt & Miller,
1968; Donehew, Parker & McDermott, 1972).
People that do not like Arabs, for example,
could work closely with Arabs and have a
positive relationship. Despite a positive
working relationship, dogmatic people would
maintain their dislike of Arabs because
dogmatic people would not integrate a
positive working relationship with their
negative view of Arabs. Conversely, nondogmatic people may discount their dislike of
Arabs because non-dogmatic people would
reassess their negative view of Arabs and
integrate their experience of a positive
working relationship.
Dogmatic people are more likely than
non-dogmatic people to hold extreme views
(Leone, 1989). Dogmatic people
compartmentalize their beliefs and are
therefore likely to hold inconsistent beliefs
about a person, object, event, or issue. During
thought, dogmatic people would not integrate
inconsistent information to challenge other
beliefs. Due to the thinking style of dogmatic
people, they are likely to experience thought-

induced attitude polarization (Leone, 1989).
Non-dogmatic people have an integrated set
of beliefs and thus would analyze and
reconsider all aspects of a person, object,
event, or issue. During thought, non-dogmatic
people are able to recognize that they hold
inconsistent beliefs. Due to the thinking style
of non-dogmatic people, they are not likely to
experience much thought-induced attitude
polarization (Leone, 1989).
Another individual difference
associated with thought-induced attitude
change is a person’s need for cognition.
Researchers use the Need for Cognition Scale
to measure individual differences in the
tendency to seek out and enjoy effortful
cognitive activities (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982;
Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996).
High need for cognition individuals like to
think about a variety of issues (including
social, political, and international). Low need
for cognition individuals do not like to think
about such issues. High need for cognition
individuals are seen as “chronic cognizers,”
whereas low need for cognition individuals
are seen as “cognitive misers” (Cacioppo et
al., 1996, p. 247). High need to for cognition
individuals generally enjoy thinking even
when not necessary. High need for cognition
individuals, for example, would solve
challenging puzzles for fun. Low need for
cognition individuals engage in effortful
thought only when necessary. Low need for
cognition individuals, for example, would
solve challenging puzzles only if required.
The effort of high need for cognition
individuals and the lack of effort of low need
for cognition individuals does not, however,
reflect their level of intelligence (see
Cacioppo et al., 1996, for a review).
As opposed to low need for cognition
individuals, high need for cognition
individuals tend to be more knowledgeable
about a variety of social issues (see Cacioppo
et al., 1996, for a review). Compared to low
need for cognition individuals, high need for
cognition individuals tend to analyze their
beliefs and consider both sides of an issue
(i.e., both pros and cons) and thus formulate
complex schemas (Fletcher, Danilovics,

Fernandez, Peterson, & Reeder, 1986). Due to
their analysis and reanalysis, high need for
cognition individuals experience more
difficulty than do low need for cognition
individuals in reaching a conclusive decision
about an issue (Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992;
Priester & Petty, 1995). Also, if high need for
cognition individuals perceive a bias, they are
more likely than low need for cognition
individuals to make a cognitive effort to
compensate for their bias (D’Agostino &
Fincher-Kiefer, 1992; Petty & Jarvis, 1996;
Petty & Wegener, 1993).
Unlike low need for cognition
individuals, high need for cognition
individuals also analyze arguments presented
by others (Smith & Petty, 1996). Due to their
analysis, high need for cognition individuals
are less likely than low need for cognition
individuals to change their attitude
immediately after a persuasive argument (see
Cacioppo et al., 1996, for a review). During
their analysis, high need for cognition
individuals employ their complex schemas to
develop counter arguments. After full
consideration (which may take minutes,
hours, days or weeks), high need for cognition
individuals will make a decision about the
argument. If high need for cognition
individuals believe a speaker presented a
strong argument, they will change their
attitude. High need for cognition individuals
will not be persuaded if they believe a speaker
presented a weak argument and they will
dismiss a speakers’ argument because the
argument did not withstand scrutiny. In
contrast, low need for cognition individuals
do not employ their complex schemas to
develop counter arguments. Low need for
cognition individuals will make a decision
about the argument quickly. If low need for
cognition individuals were exposed to a
speaker who presented a strong argument,
they will change their attitude but not because
they evaluated the argument. Low need for
cognition individuals will not be persuaded if
they believe a speaker presented a weak
argument, however, because they do not exert
the cognitive energy to fully consider the
merits of the argument they will likely change

their attitude. Low need for cognition
individuals are more easily influenced than
high need for cognition individuals by
superficial aspects such as the appearance of a
message (e.g., a colorful commercial), person
speaking (e.g., a celebrity or popularity),
expertise of a speaker (e.g., doctor or
layperson), or the number of arguments (e.g.,
five instead of two) presented (Cacioppo,
Petty, & Kao, 1983; Cacioppo et al., 1996).
Situations such as high personal
relevance do arise where both high and low
need for cognition individuals pay close
attention and carefully scrutinize information
(Axsom, Yates, & Chaiken, 1987). There are
also situations such as low personal relevance
where both high and low need for cognition
individuals conserve cognitive effort (Axsom
et al., 1987). When a speaker’s message is
low in personal relevance, an audiences’
reaction during a presentation influences
attitudes of participants low in need for
cognition because low need for cognition
individuals do not enjoy cognitive effort
(Axsom et al., 1987). An audiences’ reaction
does not influence attitudes of participants
high in need for cognition as opposed to
attitudes of participants low in need for
cognition, because high need for cognition
individuals enjoy cognitive effort. When a
speaker’s message is high in personal
relevance, however, audience reaction does
not affect participants low in need for
cognition or participants high in need for
cognition (Axsom et al., 1987). That is, when
a situation is important, high and low need for
cognition individuals are attentive.

People’s need for cognition also
affects attitude polarization (Leone, 1994;
Leone & Ensley, 1986). Specifically, low
need for cognition individuals, as compared to
high need for cognition individuals, find less
difficulty in generating consistent beliefs as
the opportunity for thought increases (Leone,
1994; Leone & Ensley, 1986). As the
generation of consistent beliefs increases so
too does attitude polarization. When low need
for cognition individuals analyze their beliefs,
they discount inconsistent beliefs (Leone,
1994). Low need for cognition individuals do
not access multiple schemas for analysis
because these individuals likely do not have
multiple schemas developed. If they do have
multiple schemas, low need for cognition
individuals do not want to exert the cognitive
effort necessary to access them. When high
need for cognition individuals analyze their
beliefs, they add new information to their
established beliefs. High need for cognition
individuals will access multiple schemas for
analysis. High need for cognition individuals
typically have multiple schemas developed
for a variety of issues. High need for
cognition individuals will exert the cognitive
effort necessary to access their schemas.
Thus, high need for cognition individuals
have a more difficult time than do low need
for cognition individuals in generating
consistent beliefs about some stimuli (Leone,
1994). Therefore, high need for cognition
individuals are less susceptible than low need
for cognition individuals to attitude
polarization.

Table 2
Summary of High Need for Cognition Individuals and Low Need for Cognition
Individuals
High Need for Cognition Individuals

Low Need for Cognition Individuals

Enjoy cognitive effort.

Do not like to exert cognitive effort.

More knowledgeable about a variety of
social issues.

Less knowledgeable about a variety of
social issues.

Have difficulty reaching a conclusive
decision because they like to analyze their
beliefs.

Do not have difficulty reaching a decision
because they follow a readily available
schema.

Likely to correct judgment bias.

Not likely to correct judgment bias.

Not likely to change their attitude
immediately after a persuasive argument.

Likely to change their attitudes
immediately after a persuasive argument.

When the argument is not important, will
pay attention.

When the argument is not important, will
not pay attention.

When the argument is important, will pay
attention.

When the argument is important, will pay
attention.

Low opportunity for thought: less
susceptible to attitude polarization; less
likely to depolarize.

Low opportunity for thought: susceptible to
attitude polarization; not likely to
depolarize.

High opportunity for thought: susceptible
to some attitude polarization; likely to
depolarization.

High opportunity for thought: susceptible
attitude polarization; not likely to
depolarize.

Attitude Structure
People derive a specific attitude about
an issue from a broad attitude about the same
or similar issue (Chaiken & Yates, 1985;
Eagley & Chaiken, 1998). People who have a
negative attitude about foreigners, for
example, are more likely than people who
have a positive attitude about foreigners to
believe that foreigners are terrorists. People
also tend to unknowingly structure their
attitudes in a top-down hierarchy in which

general attitude (e.g., foreigners are bad) is
closer to the top and a specific attitude (e.g.,
War on Terror) is closer to the bottom
(Eagley & Chaiken, 1998). Attitudes at the
top of a hierarchy are more readily available
than attitudes at the bottom of a hierarchy
(Eagley & Chaiken, 1998). People’s general
attitudes tend to lay a foundation for many
other attitudes, beliefs, and values on related
issues (see Table 3; Feather, 1996).

Table 3.
Hierarchical attitude structure (top to bottom)

Value:
foreigners
are bad

General Value (e.g., foreigners are bad)
Intermediate (e.g., foreigners are terrorists)
Specific Attitude (e.g., War on Terror, against
liberal policy on immigration, etc.)

Researchers also link attitudes to ideologies
(Chaiken & Yates, 1985; Kinder & Sears,
1985). Ideologies include a wide variety of
schemas in which these schemas are in a
hierarchical structure. That is, an ideology
(i.e., general attitude) is at the top and a
schema (i.e., intermediate or specific attitude)
is at the intermediate level or the bottom.
Basically, ideologies are a set of beliefs about
interrelated issues and schemas are a set of
beliefs about one particular issue. Following
the previous example about foreigners,
people’s attitude that foreigners are terrorists
could be a schema, and this schema could be
categorized under an ideology of foreigners
are bad.
When people have such an attitude
structure (i.e., specific attitudes derived from
general attitudes), people find difficulty in
changing a specific attitude (Eagley &
Chaiken, 1998). Given a complex ideology
and schema structure from which people
derive values for multiple issues, people
might have difficulty changing an attitude
because such a process could require a great
deal of effort. That is, people might need to
analyze and reanalyze several specific
attitudes to change one general attitude.
Following figure one, people might need to
analyze their attitudes and beliefs about issues
one (i.e., foreigners are terrorists), two (i.e.,
foreigners can’t be trusted) and three (i.e.,
conservative on immigration) to affect their
attitude about a value (i.e., foreigners are
bad).

Issue 1:
foreigners
are
terrorists

Issue 2:
foreigners
can’t be
trusted

Issue 3:
conservative
on
immigration

Figure 1. Ideology and Schema Relationship

Key
Ideology
Schema

Because low need for cognition
individuals do not like to exert mental effort
and tend to have less complex ideology and
schema structures than do high need for
cognition individuals (Cacioppo et al., 1996),
low need for cognition individuals will be
more likely than high need for cognition
individuals to change an attitude about a
specific issue (Leone, 1994). Also, because
low need for cognition individuals have less
complex ideology than do high need for
cognition individuals, attitudes of low need
for cognition individuals are weaker and will
be less constant (i.e., predictable) over a
period of time (Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992).
Low need for cognition individuals’ possess a
small repository of information and
arguments that provide a weak basis for their
attitudes (Cacioppo et al., 1986) thereby
allowing low need for cognition individuals to
experience greater attitude polarization than
high need for cognition individuals (see figure
2). High need for cognition individuals enjoy
exerting mental effort and tend to have more
complex ideology and schema structures than
do low need for cognition individuals (Leone,
1994), and thus high need for cognition

individuals will be less likely than low need
for cognition individuals to change an attitude
about a specific issue. Also, because high
need for cognition individuals have a more
complex ideology than do low need for
cognition individuals’, high need for
cognition individuals’ attitudes are stronger
and will be more constant (i.e., predictable)
over a period of time (Cacioppo et al., 1996).

Attitude Support for Low Need for Cognition
Individual

That is, high need for cognition individuals’
possess a large repository of information and
arguments that provide a strong basis for their
developed attitudes (Cacioppo et al., 1986)
thereby allowing high need for cognition
individuals to be more resistant than low need
for cognition individuals to attitude
polarization (see figure 2).

Attitude Support for High Need for
Cognition Individual
Argument 1

Argument 1

Argument 2

Argument 1

Attitude

Argument 3

Argument 1

Argument 1

Attitude

Argument 4

Argument 1

Argument 1

Argument 1

Argument 1

Figure 2. Low need for cognition versus high need for cognition attitude structure.

Summary and Hypothesis
When people use schemas, some
beliefs become salient (i.e., prominent). In
addition, people’s schemas give people rules
for thought. Through use of schemas,
people’s beliefs tend to become evaluatively
consistent. Also, when people follow a
schema salient cognitions can change. Thus,
if people’s beliefs become evaluatively
consistent, then the more people think, the
more their feelings (i.e., attitudes) should
polarize.
Following previous theory and
research (Leone, & Ensley, 1985; Tesser,
1978), it is predicted that the amount of time

given for thought (i.e., longer opportunity for
thought) will influence the amount of attitude
polarization. Additionally, individual
differences in need for cognition affect the
extent to which attitudes will polarize. It is
predicted that when given a longer
opportunity for thought, attitudes of low need
for cognition individuals will polarize,
whereas attitudes of high need for cognition
individuals will depolarize. Finally, when
considering theory on ideologies (Kinder &
Sears, 1985), if the effect of opportunity for
thought is limited to the issue considered,
then attitudes about all other issues, for both
high and low need for cognition individuals,

will not polarize. If, however, the effects of
opportunity for thought do generalize, it is
predicted that attitudes of low need for
cognition individuals will become extreme
even about issues they did not specifically
consider. It is predicted that attitudes of high
need for cognition individuals will depolarize
about issues they did not specifically
consider.
Method
Participants
The experimenter recruited 153
university students using the Psychology
Department participant pool. Participants
volunteered for a study on “Individual
Differences in Views on International and
Athletic Issues.” Participants received extracredit. Participation was voluntary as students
could earn extra-credit by other means.
Participants were predominantly
White, (n = 93) enrolled in undergraduate
psychology courses. The remainder of
participants reported that their racial
backgrounds were Asian (n = 15), Black (n =
27), Latino (n = 13), or Other (n = 5). Efforts
were not made to recruit an equal number of
female (123) and male (30) participants.
Participants reported their ages in terms of
age ranges: between 18 and 22, 22.2% (n =
34); between 23 and 27, 4.6% (n = 7);
between 28 and 32, 3.9% (n = 6); between 33
and 37, 7.2% (n = 11); 38 and older.
Participants’ ages were atypical of traditional
university students because the university is a
commuter school (i.e., most students live off
campus) with an older, non-traditional
population (Sears, 1996).
Several (n = 7) participants did not
respond to one statement on their
questionnaire. Data from three participants
were excluded because they left several
statements unanswered. A female
experimenter randomly assigned participants
to an experimental condition before this study
began. She obtained informed consent in
writing from all participants and treated them
in accordance with APA standards (American
Psychological Association, 1992). At the end
of the study, she debriefed every participant.

She obtained Institutional Review Board
approval before collecting any data.
Procedure
A female experimenter greeted
individual participants as they entered a room
and briefly explained the purpose of the
experiment (i.e., to learn about individual
differences in students’ attitudes on a variety
of international and athletic issues). She
informed participants that their responses are
confidential. Then she advised participants
that because participation was voluntary, they
could withdraw from the study at any time
without penalty. Participants had an
opportunity to ask questions to ensure they
were adequately informed. Participants then
signed an informed consent form.
The first part of the procedure
involved an interview similar to the procedure
used by Leone (1989). A female experimenter
showed participants a 15-point scale with
endpoints labeled as strongly agree (+ 7),
neutral (0), and strongly disagree (– 7).
Intermediate points were also labeled; + 4 was
labeled as moderately agree and – 4 was
labeled as moderately disagree. She explained
this scale to each participant. Then she
provided an example of a statement (i.e.,
Alligators should be removed from ponds
adjacent to houses) similar to statements
participants would read. She then
demonstrated to participants the manner in
which to respond to a statement to indicate
their attitude (e.g., + 7 if they strongly agreed
or – 7 if they strongly disagreed). To ensure
participants clearly understood how to use the
scale to indicate their attitude, she provided
another example (i.e., Every street should
have a crossing guard to assist children) and
asked participants to respond out loud with
the number closest to their attitude. She then
gave each participant the scale to use during
the first part of the procedure and participants
were given an opportunity to ask questions.
After providing an explanation of the
scale, she presented seventy statements to
participants: thirty-five statements about
international issues and thirty-five statements
about athletic issues. She presented

participants with one statement at a time.
Statements about international issues were
presented before statements about athletic
issues. Each statement was typed on a 5” by
8” note card to allow for easy randomization
of statement order within each category (i.e.,
international or athletic). Each note card
contained one statement regarding an
international issue (e.g., There should be
stricter laws against international computer
crime) or an athletic issue (e.g., College
athletes should be paid). Participants had
approximately 10 seconds to verbally respond
to each statement. A written number on the
back of each note card to allowed for easy
recording of participant responses. She
recorded participant responses on a coding
sheet to which participants had no access and
thus could not compare later responses to
current responses.
Once participants responded to each
statement, she informed them that she was
especially interested in their thoughts about
several issues in particular. Participants were
then told they would be asked to think about
several selected issues. She selected two
statements concerning international issues to
which participants responded with a
moderately agree response (i.e., + 4) and two
statements regarding international issues to
which participants responded with a
moderately disagree response (i.e., – 4). If a
participant did not respond with a moderately
agree or moderately disagree to any
statements, then she selected the next closest
response (i.e., +3 or –3). Once she selected
four issues, she read out loud one of the four
issues to each participant and allowed the
participant to read the issue as well.
Participants did not have access to the 15point scale while they thought about the
issues. Similar to Leone’s (1989) experiment,
she informed participants that
I just had you rate the issues based on how
you currently feel. Now I would like you
to gather your thoughts about several
issues in particular. I will give you one
issue at a time. Concentrate all your
thoughts on the issue during the time I
give you. You might want to think about

how you feel about the issue. You might
want to think about important facts related
to the issue. Or you might want to think
about your own personal beliefs about the
issue. Just think about the issue and
continue to think about it until I tell you to
stop. Please think about [the experimenter
read out loud one of the issues previously
selected] (p. 1245).
Before the experiment began, she randomly
assigned participants to one of two
opportunities for thought: to think about the
issue for either 30 or 90 seconds (Leone,
1989). She counterbalanced the issue order
(i.e., positive vs. negative) within opportunity
for thought times (i.e., 30 or 90 seconds).
However, the assigned time was used for
every issue.
Once opportunity for thought ended,
the experimenter told participants (Leone,
1989)
Now that you’ve had a chance to collect
your thoughts, I’d like you to once again
indicate how you feel. Sometimes
people’s feelings change even over a short
a period of time as this. Of course, you
may or may not feel the same way about
the issue. Using the scale in front of you,
just indicate how you now feel about [the
experimenter reiterated the issue] (p.
1245).
She showed participants the 15-point scale
and recorded their responses on a coding
sheet to which participants had no access. She
repeated the above procedure for the three
remaining statements.
To assess issue-specific attitude
polarization, participant “pre-test” (i.e., before
given opportunity for thought) responses are
compared to participant “post-test” (i.e., after
given opportunity for thought) responses for
each of the four issues. If a participant’s
initial attitude strengthened, the response was
assigned a score of “1” (e.g., if a participant’s
initial attitude changed from a + 4 to a + 6 or
a – 4 to a – 7, then the response was assigned
a “1”). If a participant’s initial attitude
weakened, the response was assigned a score
of “-1” (e.g., if a participant’s initial attitude

change from a + 4 to a + 2 or a – 4 to a – 1,
then the response was assigned a “-1”). If a
participant’s attitude remained the same, the
response was assigned a score of “0” (e.g., if
a participants attitude remains at + 4 or – 4,
then the response was assigned a “0”). Once
scores were assigned to each individual
statement, the scores for all four issues were
summed.
Once participants re-rated their
attitude on the selected four issues, she told
participants:
Now, I’d like you to take another look at
all the statements. I will follow the same
procedure as before. I will give you the
note card and I would like you to once
again respond out loud with the number
closest to your attitude about the issue
now. Go with your gut reaction. You
might feel the same way or you might not.
It is okay either way. Just go with your
gut reaction.
As in the first portion of the experiment, she
recorded participant’s responses on a coding
sheet to which participants had no access.
Two different methods were used to
assess participants overall attitude
polarization. In the first method, participant’s
“pre-test” (i.e., before given opportunity for
thought) response was compared to their
“post-test” (i.e., after given opportunity for
thought) response for each of the thirty issues.
If a participant’s initial attitude strengthened,
the response was assigned a score of “1”. If a
participant’s initial attitude weakened, the
response was assigned a score of “-1”. If a
participant’s attitude remained the same, the
response was assigned a score of “0”. Once a
score was assigned to each individual
statement, response scores for the
international and athletic issues were summed
separately.
In the second method, the focus was
on the extremity of overall attitude
polarization. For each “pre-test” and “posttest” statement for international and athletic
issues, a score was derived through assessing
the absolute value of each response. That is, if
a participant’s response to a statement was
“+5”, then the score for the statement was

“5”. If a participant’s response to a statement
was “–5”, then the score for the statement was
“5”. Once a score was assigned to each
statement, response scores for the “pre-test”
international issues, “pre-test” athletic issues,
“post-test” international issues and “post-test”
athletic issues were summed separately.
Following the completion of the
interview, participants completed the 18-item
Need for Cognition Scale to measure
individual differences in the tendency to seek
out and enjoy effortful cognitive activities
(Cacioppo et al., 1984). Participants’
evaluated each statement as being
characteristic of themselves on a scale of 1 to
5 (i.e., 1: extremely uncharacteristic; 2:
somewhat uncharacteristic, 3: uncertain; 4:
somewhat characteristic; 5: extremely
characteristic). Nine statements on the Need
for Cognition Scale are positively worded
(e.g., “I only think as hard as I have to”) such
that agreement is indicative of a low need for
cognition; nine statements on the Need for
Cognition Scale are negatively worded (e.g.,
“I usually end up deliberating about issues
even when they do not affect me personally”)
such that agreement is indicative of a high
need for cognition.
Responses to all individual statements
were scored such that a higher score is
indicative of a higher need for cognition. For
statements where participants left an item
unanswered, the mean for the response of the
entire sample was used. Once scores were
assigned to the individual responses, a total
score for each participant was obtained via
summation of scores for individual responses.
High scores indicate a high need for cognition
(i.e., participant likes to engage in effortful
thought), whereas low scores indicate a low
need for cognition (i.e., participant does not
like to engage in effortful thought). A median
split of the entire range of scores on the Need
for Cognition Scale was used to categorize
participants as high or low in the need for
cognition.
Researchers found that Need for
Cognition Scale scores are reliable. Many
researchers found Cronbach’s alphas ranging
from .81 to .97 (e.g., Cacioppo, et al., 1984;

Peltier & Schibrowky, 1994; Sadowski, 1993;
Sadowski & Gulgoz, 1992b; Spotts, 1994). In
this study, a Cronbach’s alpha of α = .89 was
obtained for scores on the Need for Cognition
Scale. Researchers also assessed test-retest
reliability with for Need for Cognition Scale
scores. Over a seven-week period, Sadowski
and Gulgoz (1992) found a test-retest
correlation of .88 (p < .01).
In addition, researchers found the
Need for Cognition Scale scores to have
discriminant validity. In measuring
dogmatism, for example, researchers found
only a weak negative correlation with the
need for cognition scores (r = -.23, p < .05,
Cacioppo & Petty (1982), study 3 & 4). As
expected, researchers also found the Need for
Cognition Scale scores to be negatively, but
weakly, related to intolerance of ambiguity (r
= -.31, ns, Petty & Jarvis, 1996) and openness
to new ideas (meta-analysis rave = -.34, p <
.01, Petty & Jarvis, 1996). Furthermore,
researchers found that Need for Cognition
Scale scores do not significantly relate to test
anxiety (r = .02, ns, Cacioppo & Petty, 1982)
and social desirability (meta-analysis rave =
.14, p < .01, Cacioppo & Petty, 1982; Petty &
Jarvis, 1996).
Additionally, researchers found the
Need for Cognition Scale scores to have
convergent validity. As would be expected,
researchers also found that Need for
Cognition Scale scores positively relate to the
generation of attributes for peoples behavior
(r = .36, p < .001, Fletcher, Danilovics,
Fernandez, Peterson, & Redder, 1986; r = .51,
p < .01, Petty & Jarvis, 1996), the desire to
think (r = .40, p < .05, Venkatraman, Marlino,
Kardes, & Sklar, 1990a), and the desire to
evaluate (r = .35, p < .05, Jarvis & Petty,
1996).
Participants’ sex, age, and race were
also assessed through a series of demographic
questions. Participants were asked their sex.
Response options included male and female.
Participants were asked about their age.
Response options included 18 – 22, 23 – 27,
28 – 32, 33 – 37, or 38 and older. Participants
were asked their race. Response options
included Asian, Black / African-American,

Caucasian / White, Latino / Hispanic, or
Other.
Results
Overview of Design and Analysis
This study was a 2 (low vs. high
opportunity for thought) by 2 (low vs. high
need for cognition) factorial design. The
dependent variables of interest in this study
were issue-specific attitude polarization and
overall attitude polarization. Participant
scores on issue-specific attitude polarization
and overall attitude polarization were
analyzed using a 2 (opportunity for thought)
by 2 (need for cognition) analysis of variance
(ANOVA).
Main Analyses
Issue-Specific Attitude Polarization. It
was hypothesized that the longer participants
thought (i.e., high opportunity for thought)
about a particular issue, the more their
attitudes would become polarized on that
issue. Additionally, it was hypothesized that
people’s need for cognition would be related
to the extent to which people’s attitudes
would become polarized. That is, given a high
opportunity for thought, low need for
cognition people’s attitudes would become
polarized but high need for cognition people’s
attitudes would become depolarized. If these
hypotheses were supported, a two-way
interaction between opportunity for thought
and need for cognition would be expected.
Contrary to these hypotheses, people
with a longer opportunity for thought did not
experience more attitude polarization (M =
0.22, SD = 1.96) than did people with a
shorter opportunity for thought (M = -0.22,
SD = 1.89). There was no statistically
significant difference in attitude polarization
between levels of opportunity for thought
(i.e., 30 sec. vs. 90 sec.). That is, there was no
main effect of opportunity for thought on
issue-specific attitude polarization, F (1, 149)
= 1.73, p > .20.
As expected, whether or not people’s
attitudes became polarized depended on
people’s need for cognition and opportunity
for thought about an issue. That is, there was

a statistically significant interaction between
opportunity for thought and need for
cognition on issue-specific attitude

polarization, F (1, 149) = 8.02, p < 0.01.
People’s attitude change, however, was not in
the direction expected (see Figure 3).

Mean Attitude Change

Figure 3. Mean attitude change as a function of opportunity for thought and need for cognition.
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Individuals low in need for cognition
experienced more attitude polarization given a
low opportunity for thought (M = 0.41, SD =
1.79) than individuals low in need for
cognition given a high opportunity for
thought (M = -0.06, SD = 1.85). Individuals
high in need for cognition experienced more
attitude polarization given a high opportunity
for thought (M = 0.46, SD = 2.05) than
individuals high in need for cognition given a
low opportunity for thought (M = -0.88, SD =
1.81). In short, there was no empirical support
for this hypothesis. That is, given a high
opportunity for thought, low need for
cognition people’s attitudes did not become
polarized and high need for cognition
people’s attitudes did not become
depolarized.
Overall Attitude Polarization. If the
effects of opportunity for thought are limited
to the issue being considered (e.g., a specific
international issue), then people’s attitudes
about related issues they did not specifically
consider (e.g., all other international issues)
should not become polarized. If people
consider four international issues out of 35

international issues, for example, then
people’s attitudes about the remaining 31
international issues they did not specifically
consider should not become polarized. If,
however, the effects of opportunity for
thought do generalize, then people’s attitudes
about related issues they did not specifically
consider should also become polarized
whereas their attitudes about non-related
issues (e.g., athletic issues) should not be
affected. If people consider four international
issues out 35 international issues and 35
athletic issues, for example, then people’s
attitudes about the remaining 31 international
issues they did not specifically consider
should become polarized whereas their
attitudes about the 35 athletic issues should
not be affected. Moreover, if people’s
attitudes about related issues polarize, then
overall attitude polarization should be related
in part to people’s need for cognition. During
high opportunity for thought, low need for
cognition people should be more likely than
high need for cognition people to experience
more overall attitude polarization. In contrast,
during low opportunity for thought, both low

and high need for cognition people should not
experience overall attitude polarization.
If these hypotheses were supported,
there should be a four-way interaction
between opportunity for thought (low vs.
high), need for cognition (low vs. high), type
of issue (international vs. athletic), and time
of assessment (pre-thought vs. post-thought).
To evaluate these hypotheses, a 2 (low vs.
high opportunity for thought) x 2 (low vs.
high need for cognition) x 2 (international vs.
athletic issues ratings) x 2 (pre-thought vs.
post-thought ratings) ANOVA with repeated
measures on the last two factors was
conducted on participants’ overall attitude
polarization. Contrary to expectations, effects
of opportunity for thought did not generalize
more for low need for cognition people than
for high need for cognition people.
Additionally, effects of opportunity for
thought did not generalize more for related
issues than for non-related issues. In short, the
four-way interaction between opportunity for
thought, need for cognition, type of issue, and
time of assessment did not occur as predicted,
F < 1.00.
Although not predicted, there was a
main effect for type of issue (i.e.,
international vs. athletic issues). In general,
people experienced more attitude polarization
about athletic issues (M = 317.08, SD =
60.36) than they experienced about
international issues (M = 259.87, SD = 59.98),
F (1, 149) = 228.60, p < .01. There was also a
main effect for time of assessment (i.e., prethought or post-thought). In general, people
experienced more polarized attitudes postthought (M = 291.12, SD = 58.93) than they
did pre-thought (M = 285.84, SD = 54.81)
regardless of the type of issue considered, F
(1, 149) = 6.57, p < .01. In short, people’s
attitudes were more polarized about athletic
issues than international issues and people’s
attitudes were more polarized about both
issues (athletic and international) postthought.

Secondary Analysis
After conducting the main analysis, a
series of secondary analyses using (a)
participant’s self-reported athletic television
viewing and (b) participant’s self-reported
news television viewing were conducted.
Specifically, we conducted a series of chisquare analyses using participants’ individual
differences in need for cognition and
responses to questions about television
viewing. Participant responses to athletic
viewing questions were assessed first. There
was no relationship between participants’
scores on the Need for Cognition Scale and
how frequently participants reported watching
athletics on television. High and low need for
cognition individuals did not significantly
differ in how frequently they watched
athletics on television in general, χ2 (3, N =
153) = 2.91, p > .05. There was also no
relationship between participants’ scores on
the Need for Cognition Scale and their
response to how frequently they watched
athletics on particular networks. That is, high
and low need for cognition individuals did not
significantly differ in how frequently they
watched athletics on CBS, ABC, NBC, FOX,
or TNT (see Table 4).
Table 4
Chi-Square Results for Frequency of Athletic
Television Viewing
News Station

Chi-square

CBS

χ2 = 1.53, p > .05

ABC

χ2 = 4.02, p > .05

NBC

χ2 = 4.66, p > .05

FOX

χ2 = 5.21, p > .05

TNT
χ2 = 5.17, p > .05
(Note: for all analyses, N = 153).
There was, however, a significant
relationship between participants’ scores on
the Need for Cognition Scale and their

response to how frequently they watched
athletics on ESPN, χ2 (2, N = 153) = 6.63, p <
.05. When asked whether they watched
ESPN, high need for cognition individuals
responded ‘yes’ (41.38%) less frequently than
did low need for cognition individuals
(58.62%). High need for cognition individuals
also responded ‘no’ (48.65%) less frequently
than did low need for cognition individuals
(51.35%). But high need for cognition
individuals responded ‘not applicable’
(68.97%) more frequently than did low need
for cognition individuals (31.03%). That is,
high need for cognition individuals were less
likely than low need for cognition individuals
to watch athletics on ESPN.
There was also a significant
relationship between participants’ scores on
the Need for Cognition Scale and participants
overall athletic television station preference,
χ2 (4, N = 153) = 10.11, p < .05. Low need for
cognition individuals (51.63%) preferred to
watch CBS, ABC, and NBC more frequently
than did high need for cognition individuals
(42.86%). Low need for cognition individuals
(72.22%) also preferred to watch FOX more
frequently than did high need for cognition
individuals (27.78%). High need for cognition
individuals, however, preferred to watch TNT
(88.89%) more frequently than did low need
for cognition individuals (11.11%). High need
for cognition individuals also preferred to
watch ESPN (53.85%) more frequently than
did low need for cognition individuals
(46.15%). Finally, low need for cognition
individuals selected the ‘not applicable’
option (53.33%) more frequently than did
high need for cognition individuals (46.67%).
Participant responses to news viewing
statements were also assessed. There was no
relationship between participants’ scores on
the Need for Cognition Scale and
participants’ responses to how frequently they
watched news on particular networks. That is,
high and low need for cognition individuals
did not significantly differ in how frequently
they watched news on CBS, CNN, FOX, or
PBS (see Table 5).

Table 5
Chi-square Results for Frequency of News
Television Viewing
News Station

Chi-square

CBS

χ2 = 1.36, p > .05

CNN

χ2 = .04, p > .05

FOX

χ2 = 1.65, p > .05

PBS
χ2 = 1.79, p > .05
(Note: for all analyses, N = 153)
There was, however, a significant
relationship between participants’ scores on
the Need for Cognition Scale and their
response to watching news on NBC, χ2 (2, N
= 153) = 8.06, p < .05. When asked whether
they watched news on NBC, low need for
cognition individuals responded ‘yes’
(58.72%) more frequently than did high need
for cognition individuals (41.28%). High need
for cognition individuals, however, responded
‘no’ (67.50%) more frequently than did low
need for cognition individuals (32.50%). Both
high and low need for cognition individuals
responded ‘not applicable’ with the same
frequency (50.0%). That is, low need for
cognition individuals watched news on NBC
more frequently than did high need for
cognition individuals.
There was also a significant
relationship between participants’ scores on
the Need for Cognition Scale and their
response to watching news on ABC, χ2 (2, N
= 153) = 14.50, p < .01. When asked whether
they watched news on ABC, low need for
cognition individuals responded ‘yes’
(65.43%) or ‘not applicable’ (57.14%) more
frequently than did high need for cognition
individuals (34.57%, 42.86% respectively).
High need for cognition individuals, however,
responded ‘no’ (66.15%) more frequently
than did low need for cognition individuals
(33.85%). That is, low need for cognition
individuals watched news on ABC more

frequently than did high need for cognition
individuals.
Additionally, there was a significant
relationship between participants’ scores on
the Need for Cognition Scale and how
frequently participants watched news on
television in general, χ2 (4, N = 153) = 10.23,
p < .05. High need for cognition individuals
reported watching news 7 days a week
(57.14%) more frequently than did low need
for cognition individuals (42.86%). However,
low need for cognition individuals reported
watching news 5 days a week (58.82%) or 3
days a week (68.29%) more frequently than
did high need for cognition individuals
(41.18%, 31.71% respectively). High need for
cognition individuals reported watching news
1 day a week (62.07%) or ‘not applicable’
(71.43%) more frequently than did low need
for cognition individuals (37.93%, 28.57%
respectively).
There was no significant relationship
between participants’ scores on the Need for
Cognition Scale and participants overall news
station preference, χ2 (3, N = 153) = 4.88, p >
.05. That is, low and high need for cognition
individuals did not prefer to watch a particular
news station (e.g., FOX) more or less than
they preferred to watch a different news
station (e.g., CNN).
Discussion
People’s thoughts affect their
attitudes. Typically, given an opportunity for
thought, people’s attitudes polarize (Tesser,
1978; Tesser et al., 1995). Amount of
opportunity for thought is related to the extent
of people’s attitude polarization (Tesser &
Paulus, 1976). Individual differences, such as
their need for cognition, are related to the
amount of people’s attitude polarization
(Leone, 1989; 1994; 1996; Leone et al., 1991;
Leone & Ensley, 1986).
The first purpose of the current
research was to replicate previous research on
self-generated attitude change. It was
hypothesized that individuals given a longer
opportunity for thought would experience

more attitude polarization than would
individuals given a shorter opportunity for
thought. Although several researchers
previously replicated the self-generated
attitude change phenomenon (e.g., Leone &
Ensley, 1985; Tesser & Conlee, 1975; Tesser
& Leone, 1977), the findings in this current
study failed to support this phenomenon.
The second purpose of the current
research was to replicate the relationship
between people’s need for cognition and selfgenerated attitude change. People’s need for
cognition is their tendency to engage in and
enjoy effortful thought (Cacioppo & Petty,
1982; Cacioppo et al., 1996). It was
hypothesized that given a longer opportunity
for thought, attitudes of low need for
cognition individuals would polarize whereas
attitudes of high need for cognition
individuals would depolarize. Although
several researchers previously replicated this
relationship between people’s need for
cognition and self-generated attitude change
(e.g., Leone, 1994; Leone & Ensley, 1986),
the findings in this current study failed to
support this relationship.
The last purpose of the current
research was to extend the research on selfgenerated attitude change to include
ideologies. People’s ideologies consist of a
variety of attitudes about interrelated issues
(Kinder & Sears, 1985). People’s attitudes
about athletic issues and international issues,
for example, would be considered separate
ideologies because athletic issues (e.g.,
steroid use in college athletics) and
international issues (e.g., war on terrorism)
are not typically interrelated. It was
hypothesized that attitudes of low need for
cognition individuals would polarize about
attitude related issues they did not specifically
consider. It was also hypothesized that
attitudes of high need for cognition
individuals would depolarize about attitude
related issues they did not specifically
consider. However, there was no empirical
support in this study for low need for
cognition people’s attitude polarization for
related issues they did not specifically
consider. Similarly, there was no empirical

support in this study for high need for
cognition people’s attitude depolarization for
related issues they did not specifically
consider.
There was, however, an unexpected
effect for issue type (i.e., international vs.
athletic issues). Although people did not
specifically think about athletic issues, people
generally experienced more attitude
polarization about athletic issues than they did
about international issues. There was also an
effect for time of assessment. Overall, people
experienced more attitude polarization postthought than they did pre-thought for both
issues.
Why did people’s attitudes not polarize?
One possible explanation for a lack of
attitude polarization is a problem with
opportunity for thought manipulation. In this
study, participants received an opportunity to
think for either 30 or 90 seconds. Recall that
amount of opportunity for thought is related
to the extent of people’s attitude polarization.
Perhaps participants needed more than 30 or
90 seconds to fully consider international
issues. However, opportunity for thought was
likely not a problem in the current study.
Other researchers used similar amounts of
opportunity for thought and replicated the
self-generated attitude change process (e.g.,
Leone & Ensley, 1986; Tesser & Conlee,
1975).
Another possible explanation for a
lack of attitude polarization is participants not
receiving enough time to express their
attitudes. Other researchers found that the
more opportunity people have to express their
attitudes, the more people’s attitudes tend to
polarize (e.g., Downing, Judd, & Brauer,
1992; Judd & Brauer, 1995). However, lack
of opportunity for expression was likely not a
problem in the current study. Participants
received more opportunity to express attitudes
about international issues than they did about
athletic issues, and yet participant attitudes
polarized about athletic issues while not
polarizing about international issues.
Participants’ completion of the Need
for Cognition Scale could also be related to

their attitude polarization. In this study,
participants completed the 18-item Need for
Cognition Scale to measure individual
differences in the tendency to seek out and
enjoy effortful cognitive activities (Cacioppo
et al., 1984). Participants’ completion of the
Need for Cognition Scale was not, however,
likely to be related to their attitude
polarization because participants completed
the questionnaire after they completed all
thought activity. Additionally, other
researchers assessed people’s need for
cognition along with measuring people’s
attitude polarization and obtained the results
they expected (e.g., Leone, 1994; Leone &
Ensley, 1986; but see also Lassiter, Apple, &
Slaw, 1996; Lassiter & Apple, 1998).
Another possible explanation for a
lack of participant’s attitude polarization
specific to international issues is that
participants did not feel that international
issues were important to them. If people feel
that an issue is important to them, they are
often involved, active, and informed about
that issue (e.g., Harton & Latane, 1997;
Kaysen & Stake, 2001). If people do not feel
that an issue is important to them, they are
uninvolved, inactive, and uninformed (e.g.,
Harton & Latane,1997; Kaysen & Stake,
2001). Involved and active people are more
likely than uninvolved and inactive people to
have polarized attitudes (e.g., Liberman &
Chaiken, 1996; Liu & Latane, 1998; Plous,
1991; Smith, 1989). Additionally, informed
people are more likely than uninformed
people have polarized attitudes (e.g.,
Pomerantz, Chaiken, & Tordesillas, 1995).
Participants in this study may have felt
involved, active, and informed about athletic
issues and uninvolved, inactive, and
uninformed about international issues.
Consistent with this reasoning, paticipants’
attitudes about athletic issues became more
polarized than did their attitudes about
international issues.
If people feel uninvolved, inactive,
and uninformed about international issues,
people will likely lack a well-developed
schema. Therefore, another possible
explanation for people’s attitudes not

polarizing in the current study is a lack of
people’s schemas about international issues.
People’s attitudes often depend on their
knowledge about a person, object, event, or
issue (McGuire, 1985). In order for people’s
attitudes to polarize, people must have a
developed schema about the person, object,
event, or issue in consideration (e.g., Leone &
Ensley, 1985; Millar & Tesser, 1986;
O’Keefe & Brady, 1980). During thought,
people use their schemas to make their
information evaluatively consistent (e.g.,
Chaiken & Yates, 1985; Liberman &
Chaiken, 1991; O’Keefe & Brady, 1980).
Recall that when people use schemas during
thought, people find it easier than when not
using schemas during thought to focus on
relevant stimuli (e.g., Tesser & Danheiser,
1978), recall relevant information (e.g., Clary,
Tesser, & Downing, 1978; Tesser & Cowan,
1975), infer absent information (e.g., Leone &
Ensley, 1985), interpret relevant information
(e.g., Tesser & Cowan, 1977), and discount
questionable information (e.g., Leshowitz,
DiCerbo, & Okun, 2002; Lord et al., 1979;
Plous, 1991).
People use their well-developed schemas
about an issue to focus on relevant stimuli. If
people lack a well-developed schema about
international issues when thinking about a
specific international issue, people will not be
able to focus on relevant information. If, for
example, people think about suicide bombers
in Israel and they cannot focus on relevant
stimuli (e.g., information about Israel or
suicide bombers), then people’s attitudes will
likely not polarize.
People use their well-developed
schemas about an issue to recall relevant
information about an issue. If people lack a
well-developed schema about international
issues when thinking about a specific
international issue, people will not be able to
recall relevant information about an
international issue. If, for example, people
think about suicide bombers in Israel and they
cannot recall relevant information (e.g.,
physical characteristics of a suicide bomber),
people’s attitudes will likely not polarize.

People use their well-developed schemas
about an issue to infer absent information
about that issue. If people lack a welldeveloped schema about international issues
when thinking about a specific international
issue, people will not be able fill in any
missing information in their beliefs about an
international issue. If, for example, people
think about suicide bombers in Israel and they
cannot infer absent information (e.g.,
ethnicity of a suicide bomber), people’s
attitudes will likely not polarize.
People use their well-developed schemas
about an issue to interpret relevant
information about that issue. If people lack a
well-developed schema about international
issues when thinking about a specific
international issue, people will not be able
determine how the new information relates to
their schema. If, for example, people think
about suicide bombers in Israel and people
cannot determine the relevance of the
information to their established beliefs (e.g.,
people see Arabs exhibiting positive
characteristics when people believe that Arabs
lack positive characteristics), people’s
attitudes will likely not polarize.
People use their well-developed schemas
about an issue to discount questionable
information about that issue. If people lack a
well-developed schema about international
issues when thinking about a specific
international issue, people will ignore
questionable information. If, for example,
people think about suicide bombers in Israel
and people cannot determine and thus
discount new information that is questionable
(e.g., a Catholic rather than a Muslim
commits a suicide bombing), people’s
attitudes will likely not polarize.
Although people did not experience
overall attitude polarization about
international issues, people did experience
overall attitude polarization about athletic
issues. Because people’s attitudes polarized
about athletic issues, people likely possessed
a well-developed schema about athletic
issues. Because people’s attitudes did not
polarize about international issues, people

likely lacked a well-developed schema about
international issues.
An additional possible explanation for
a lack of people’s attitude polarization is a
problem with methodology. Participants
completed this study in several steps. First,
participants expressed their attitudes about all
issues, then participants thought about four
specific issues, and finally participants
expressed their attitudes about all issues. A
primary difference between previous studies
and this study, however, is the measurement
of ideologies (cf. Leone, 1989; Leone &
Ensley, 1986). To test people’s ideologies,
people expressed their attitudes about two
types of issues (i.e., international and athletic)
rather than only one type of issue as in
previous studies. The addition of a second
type of issue, however, likely did not affect
the results because people experienced more
attitude polarization about the second type of
issue (i.e., athletic issue) than they
experienced about the first type of issue (i.e.,
international issue).
Another possible issue with
methodology is participants only reported
their attitudes. That is, participant attitudes
were not directly assessed. Self-reported
measures may not be as valid in assessing
participant attitudes as other evaluation
methods such as direct assessment (e.g.,
Miller, McHoskey, Bane, & Dowd, 1993;
McHoskey, 1995). Therefore, any participant
self-reported attitude polarization may not
generalize to participant’s actual attitudes
(e.g., Kuhn & Lao, 1996; Miller et al., 1993).
Perhaps participant attitudes did polarize but
participants did not perceive or could not
verbally express this change. However, this
was likely not the situation because other
researchers used a similar method of
assessment and found that participant
attitudes did polarize (e.g., Leone, 1994;
1996; Leone & Ensley, 1986)
Unexpected Findings
There was, however, an unexpected
interaction between opportunity for thought
and need for cognition for issue-specific
attitude polarization. Individuals low in need

for cognition experienced more attitude
polarization given a low opportunity for
thought than did individuals low in need for
cognition given a high opportunity for
thought. Individuals high in need for
cognition experienced more attitude
polarization given a high opportunity for
thought than did individuals high in need for
cognition given a low opportunity for thought.
That is, low need for cognition individuals’
attitudes polarized given a low opportunity
for thought while high need for cognition
individuals’ attitudes polarized given a high
opportunity for thought.
Other researchers did find a
relationship between people’s attitude
polarization and people’s need for cognition
(Leone, 1994; Leone & Ensley, 1986). That
is, several researchers found that low need for
cognition individual’s attitudes polarized
more given a high opportunity for thought
than given a low opportunity for thought.
High need for cognition individual’s attitudes,
however, depolarized given a high
opportunity for thought than given a low
opportunity for thought. Conversely, Lassiter,
Apple, and Slaw (1996; see also Lassiter &
Apple, 1998) found that when participants
were not prompted to explicitly think about
their attitudes about a particular issue, high
need for cognition individual’s attitudes
polarized more than did low need for
cognition individual’s attitudes. When
participated were prompted explicitly to think
about their attitudes about a particular issue,
low need for cognition individual’s attitudes
polarized more than did high need for
cognition individual’s attitudes. That is, when
participants were prompted to think about
their attitudes, Lassiter et al. (1996) replicated
the findings of Leone and Ensley (1986).
The Leone and Ensley (1986) and
Lassiter et al. (1996) studies do have several
methodological differences. First, Leone and
Ensley (1986) had a female participant
individually interview each participant
whereas Lassiter et al. (1996) used a
computer to interview each participant.
Although an experimenter did monitor
participants in the Lassiter et al. (1996) study,

participants may not feel the same need to
comply as they would during an individual
interview. In other computer interview studies
where participants received an opportunity to
list their attitudes or believed they would
discuss their attitudes with others,
participant’s attitudes did polarize (e.g.,
Harton & Latane, 1996; Liu & Latane, 1998).
This methodological inconsistency may be the
reason for the different results found by
Leone and Ensley (1986) and by Lassiter et
al. (1996).
Second, Leone and Ensley (1986)
provided participants with the Need for
Cognition Scale after participants received an
opportunity to express their attitudes. Lassiter
et al. (1996), however, provided participants
with the Need for Cognition Scale before
participants received an opportunity to
express their attitudes. Providing participants
with the Need for Cognition Scale before they
received an opportunity to express their
attitudes may have “primed” participants.
Participants are primed when something a
participant reads, does, or watches helps them
recall a particular attitude or feeling (Smith,
1998). When participants recall one attitude
or feeling, they may recall another related
attitude or feeling (e.g., Raghubir & Johar,
1997). That is, participants may experience a
spreading activation of attitudes or feelings
(e.g., Judd, Downing, Drake, & Krosnick,
1991; Raghubir & Johar, 1997). When people
are primed for a particular attitude or feeling,
their behavior tends to reflect this primed
attitude or feeling (e.g., Berkowitz & Alioto,
1973; Bushman & Anderson, 2002). A
participant, for example, may be asked to
watch an athletic event. A participant may be
lead to believe that the athletic event is
aggressive or non-aggressive. After viewing
the event, participants lead to believe the
event was aggressive behave more
aggressively than do participants lead to
believe the event was non-aggressive (e.g.,
Berkowitz and Alioto, 1973; Bushman &
Anderson, 2002).
Because Lassiter et al. (1996) may
have primed their participants, they may have
produced atypical results. That is, when

Lassiter et al. (1996) presented participants
with the Need for Cognition Scale before
participants expressed their attitudes, both
high and low need for cognition individuals
though about themselves. Having this thought
opportunity lead to participants making their
self-concept salient and readily accessible for
the next phase of the study. However,
participants’ self-concept and their responses
may be affected by their need for cognition.
High need for cognition individuals enjoy
fully analyzing and considering all sides of an
issue (Cacioppo et al., 1996). These
individuals may believe that because high
need for cognition individuals thoroughly
analyze an issue, they hold strong beliefs.
Low need for cognition individuals only
analyze and consider all sides of an issue
when they must (Cacioppo et al., 1996).
These individuals may believe that because
low need for cognition individuals do not
thoroughly analyze an issue, they hold weak
beliefs. If the above reasoning is correct, then,
once primed, high need for cognition
individuals would express more attenuated
views than would low need for cognition
individuals. But, both high and low need for
cognition individuals would express such
views only to be consistent with the primed
self-concept and not necessarily with how
they may generally process information.
Additionally, a detailed discussion of
the Need for Cognition Scale in
undergraduate social psychology courses as
well as social psychology textbooks is
progressively becoming a common practice.
Because researchers find the Need for
Cognition Scale to be reliable (e.g., Cacioppo
et al., 1984; Sadowski, 1993; Sadowski &
Gulgoz, 1992) and scores on the measure
have discriminant validity (e.g., Cacioppo &
Petty, 1982; Petty & Jarvis, 1996), professors
often use this scale to engage their students.
Professors request for students to complete
the scale and then professors proceed to
describe characteristics of low need for
cognition individuals as well as high need for
cognition individuals to their students.
Through exposing students to the scale and
describing the scale, professors may prime

students with respect to the students’ need for
cognition.
When students participate in studies,
students may believe they know whether they
are high or low in need for cognition.
Consciously or unconsciously, participants
may respond to statements in accordance to
their belief. If, for example, students believe
they are low in need for cognition, they may
not even attempt to think about a particular
statement. If, however, students believe they
are high in need for cognition, they may
attempt to think about a particular statement.
That is, students may act in a manner
consistent with their perceived level of
cognition rather than with their actual level of
cognition. Future research on self-generated
attitude change should consider the affects of
priming on need for cognition as related to
self-generated attitude change.
Summary
Although the results of the current
research were not as expected, researchers
should continue to study the phenomenon of
self-generated attitude because of its real
world applications. Self-generated attitude
change can particularly be seen in people’s
attitudes after September 11th. As people
thought about the attack on the United States
and considered the Muslim attackers, people
became more extreme in their views of all
Muslims (Associated Press, 2005). People’s
extreme attitudes about Muslims may have
eventually lead people to support the ousting
of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the
imprisonment of ‘enemy combatants’ in
Guantanamo Bay (Jensen, 2002).
Psychologists can also use selfgenerated attitude change in practical
applications such as reduction of fear (e.g.,
Leone & Aronow, 1992; Leone & Baldwin,
1983), phobias (e.g., Leone, 1984; Leone et
al., 1983; Rothbaum, Hodges, Kooper,
Opdyke, Williford, & North, 1995), and
prejudicial attitudes (e.g., Hall, Varca, &
Fisher, 1985; Munro & Ditto, 1997). These
three phenomenon may involve the same
process. As people think, they become more
afraid, more phobic, or more prejudicial. By

understanding the self-generated attitude
change phenomenon, psychologists can
identify ways to help people reduce their
fears, help people confront their phobias, and
help people control their prejudicial attitudes.
People can also use self-generated
attitude change in business, political fields,
and college campuses. In understanding selfgenerated attitude change, marketing
managers may better understand consumer
purchase satisfaction (Smith, 1989) as well as
how people react to advertising and movies
(e.g., Garramone, Atkin, Pinkleton, & Cole,
1990; Malamuth, 1981), political strategists
may better understand how people react to
political arguments (e.g., Munro, Ditto,
Lockhart, Fagerlin, Gready, & Peterson,
2002), and university administrators may
understand how students handle controversial
issues (e.g., Rohde, 1974). Attorneys may
also use self-generated attitude change as well
as need for cognition in jury selection.
Prosecutors, for example, may seek out high
need for cognition jurors because these jurors
may be better able than are low need for
cognition jurors to scrutinize a case. In sum,
self-generated attitude change is a
phenomenon that may be related to all
professions (e.g., psychology, marketing, law)
and thus must continue to be studied.
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